Abstract-Cloud computing is an important trend that in many ways is beginning to fulfill the early promise of the Internet and creating unanticipated change in computing paradigm. As promising as cloud computing is, this paradigm brings forth new security and privacy challenges when operating in the untrusted cloud scenarios. Motivated by the challenging problem "Private Searching over Encrypted Data", we propose a new cryptographic primitive, Proxy Re-encryption with Private Searching (PRPS for short). The PRPS scheme enables the data users and owners efficiently query and access files stored in untrusted cloud, while keeping query privacy and data privacy from the cloud providers. The concrete construction is based on proxy re-encryption, public key encryption with keyword search and the dual receiver cryptosystem. Extensive analysis shows that our scheme is efficient and semantically secure under the BDH assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is an important trend which is beginning to fulfill the early promise of the Internet and creating unanticipated change in computing paradigm. However, a significant barrier to the adoption of cloud computing is that data owners fear of confidential data leakage and lose of privacy in the cloud [1] . These concerns originate from the fact that cloud providers are usually operated by commercial providers which are very likely to be outside of the trusted domain of the users. Data confidentialty against cloud providers is hence frequently desired when users outsource data for storage in the cloud [2] .
Our work is motivated by the following scenario. Data owners, cloud storage providers and data users are separated geographically. A data owner stores his files in an encrypted form in the untrusted cloud, and retrieves them wherever and whenever he wants. What's more, he wants to share his files with other data users. The user sends a query for files containing certain keywords to the cloud provider. The desired requirements are: 1) The user can decrypt the files uploaded by the data owner with his private key; 2) The cloud provider can search whether the encrypted files contain some keywords; 3) The cloud provider ought to keep blind to the files content and the query keywords of the user; 4) The user could finish query and decryption with a thin client which demands computing overhead as small as possible. We call such kind of problem as "Private Searching on Encrypted Data" (PSED for short).
A. Related work Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE)
. PRE is a cryptographic primitive, where a (potentially untrusted) proxy is given a re-encryption key 1 2 rk → that allows it to translate a message m encrypted under public key 1 pk into a cipher texts under a public key 2 pk , without being able to see anything about the encrypted messages. In [3] , Ateniese et al. proposed a single-use, unidirectional, but not transparent Proxy Re-Encryption schemes based on bilinear maps.
Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS).
In PEKS scheme, Alice creates a trapdoor with her private key and a keyword, and sends it to S. S uses a test algorithm with inputting encrypted keyword, trapdoor and user's public key. If matches, it outputs 1 and 0 otherwise. PEKS supports that a user could search for some files containing certain keywords in untrusted storage servers, and at the same time, the servers keep blind to the privacy of file and the keyword. In [4] , Boneh et al. proposed a public key encryption with keyword search scheme.
Dual receiver cryptosystem. Diament et al [5] first introduced the notion of an efficient dual receiver cryptosystem, which enables a cipher text to be decrypted by two independent receivers. The main disadvantage of the dual receiver cryptosystem is that the server needs to send an auxiliary private key to a client for decrypting a partial cipher text, which is insecure in the real environment [6] .
Liu et al. [6] improved the PEKS by inspiring the idea of dual receiver cryptosystem, and proposed an efficient privacy preserving keyword search scheme. However, this scheme exists an inherent problem. It is one specific case applicable in the setting that the data owner and data user is the same one. Shao et al. [7] introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption with keyword search (PRES), in particular the concept of bidirectional PRES, against the chosen cipher text attack. Their scheme is based on the techniques for PRE in [8] and the IBE schemes in [9] . Note that the third party is trusted and this scheme improved the security level with the sacrifice of efficiency.
Note that there are further related work [10] [11] and the latest work in Structured Encryption [12] , which also considered the problem of private querying on encrypted data, i.e. enabling user efficiently query and retrieve the encrypted files containing specific keywords.
B. Our contributions
Main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) We proposed a new cryptographic primitive, Proxy Re-encryption with Private Searching (PRPS), and the new PRPS construction combines technologies from PRE, PEKS and dual receiver cryptosystem. The PRPS scheme is able to protect the data privacy and the users' queries privacy simultaneously during the search process. And it is provably secure under the BDH assumption in random oracle model.
2) The PRPS scheme enables the decrease of computing overhead for the user.
3) It reduces the modification of encrypted sharing file storage when different users accessing the cloud provider.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses some preliminaries. Section III provides the Proxy Re-encryption with Private Searching model and its security definition. Section IV introduces the construction for PRPS. In Section V, we analyze the PRPS scheme in terms of its security and efficiency. We conclude this paper in Section VI. • TCompute：User takes private key Note. RG algorithm implies that the PRPS scheme is non-interactive, which means re-encryption keys can be generated by a data owner via the user's public key. No trusted third party or interaction is required.
We define security for the PRPS scheme in the sense of semantic security. Semantic security captures the intuition that given a cipher text, the adversary learns nothing about the corresponding plaintext, thus we also say that a semantically secure scheme is IND-CPA secure [9] . We first define semantic security for KWEnc and EMBEnc, and then give the definition of semantically secure PRPS scheme. of its choice. We use subscript T to denote the target user, x to denote the adversarial users, and h to denote the honest users (other than T ). The input marked with a '*' is optional. Pr 
IV. CONSTRUCTION FOR PRPS
We assume that the scheme is composed of the following parties, the data owner, data users, and cloud providers. To access data files shared by the data owner, data users download data files of their interest from cloud providers and then decrypt. The users are assumed to have the only access privilege of data file reading. The cloud providers are assumed to have abundant storage capacity and computation power.
In this work, cloud providers are viewed as "honest but curious", which means they follow the proposed protocol in general, but try to find out as much secret information as possible. More specifically, we assume cloud providers are more interested in file contents and user access privilege information than other secret information. Cloud providers might collude with malicious users for the purpose of harvesting file contents when it is highly beneficial. Communication channel between the data owner/users and cloud providers are assumed to be secured. Users may work independently or cooperatively. In addition, each party is preloaded with a public/private key pair and the public key can be easily obtained by other parties when necessary.
The main design goal is to help the data users achieve efficient private querying and downloading the encrypted files stored in cloud providers. The data owner won't need to re-encrypt the files in cloud provider for different users. We also want to prevent cloud providers from being able to learn both the data file contents and user queries information.
The • • Re-Encryption( R ): to change the cipher text to recover the message m .
Note that: 
O time Α .
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 4.2 in [6] . Privacy for Keyword guarantees the user's query privacy, namely, the cloud provider learns nothing about what the user's querying for in this process. In our scheme, the file is encrypted with the data owner's public key before its storage in the untrusted cloud. A user sends a trapdoor with inputting encrypted keyword to query for a file which including the encrypted keyword. The cloud provider will have no knowledge of the file's keyword, only if it obtains the private key of the data owner.
2) Privacy for Message Our security definition quantifies over all encryption algorithms; in this case, we have two algorithms 
B. Efficiency Analysis
This section evaluates the efficiency of the PRPS scheme in terms of the computation overhead introduced by each operation. We use computation time to denote the computation overhead of the algorithm operated by different roles (for example, the data owner, the user). Encryption (KWEnc, EMBEnc) and Re-Encryption Key Generation are operated by the data owner; ReEncryption and Test are operated by the cloud provider and the user's operation are Tcompute and Decryption.
Suppose the runtime of exponent arithmetic (EXP) The comparison in the runtimes for the cryptographic operations in PRPS scheme is given in TABLE I. These results indicate that the runtimes of hash arithmetic and exponent arithmetic operated by a user are much less than the ones of cloud provider's and data owner's operations. The scheme transfers most computation cost from the user to the cloud provider decrease the computation overhead and enhance the efficiency of the user. That makes sense to the application of cloud computing with thin clients.
Note. In our scheme, a data owner takes his own private key, the user's public key and a random element as the inputs, and produces re-encryption . Thus, there is no need to deliver the user's private key to the data owner or interact with the third party for the re-encryption key, which implies that our PRPS scheme is non-interactive.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an efficient proxy reencryption with private searching (PRPS) scheme in the untrusted cloud. We exploit proxy re-encryption and uniquely combining it with techniques of public key encryption with keyword search and dual receiver cryptosystem. PRPS allows users and data owners to query and access files storage in untrusted cloud provider, while maintaining query privacy and data privacy. It allows user to decrypt the files efficiently. The PRPS scheme is proven semantically secure in the random oracle model. We indicate that the challenging "Private Searching on Encrypted Data" problem is of independent interest and deserved further study.
